




































Herding of Institutional Traders:





This paper sheds new light on herding of institutional investors by using a unique
database that identifies every transaction made by financial institutions in the
German stock market. First, the analysis reveals that herding behavior of insti-
tutions occurs daily. Second, replication of the analysis with low-frequency and
anonymous transaction data indicates that previous studies overestimate herding.
Third, our results suggest that herding by large financial institutions mainly re-
sults from shared preference and investment styles. Fourth, a panel analysis shows
that herding on the sell side in stocks is positively related to past returns and past
volatility, whereas herding on the buy side is negatively related to these variables.
Hence, large financial institutions do not demonstrate positive feedback strategies.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of literature establishes the tendency of investors to accumulate on the
same side of the market, known as herding behavior. This kind of trading pattern is
often held responsible for destabilizing stock prices, increasing price volatility, and gen-
erally threatening the stability of the financial market (see, e.g., Scharfstein and Stein
(1990), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), or Hwang and Salmon (2004)). There are several
types of herd behavior, distinguished by various explanations for the co-movement.
Generally, herding is dived into sentiment-driven intentional herding and unintentional
herding driven by fundamentals (see, e.g., Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001)). Distin-
guishing between different sources of herding is crucial not only for regulatory purposes,
but also in discovering whether herding leads to market inefficiency and/or financial
bubbles.
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on the herding behavior of institutional
investors, including banks and other financial institutions. Due to the predominance
of this class of investors in the stock market, institutions have the power to move the
market and impact prices, even more if they herd. This possibility, and its consequences,
emphasizes the importance of discovering first whether institutional investors herd and,
if so, second the determinants of such behavior.
To date, the literature on institutional herding has been severely handicapped by the un-
availability of appropriate data; however, this current paper employs a unique dataset
comprised of daily-investor level data. Previous studies rely either on low-frequency
data or on anonymous transaction data. Empirical assessment of herding requires dis-
aggregated investor-level data. In general, the positions taken by institutions on the
stock market are reported infrequently, if at all. For example, for U.S. mutual funds
or other institutional investors, reports of holdings are available only on a quarterly
basis (see, e.g., Choi and Sias (2009), Wermers (1999)). Using such low-frequency data
does not allow capturing trades that are completed within the period and does not
reveal herding if it occurs within a shorter time interval. Studies employing this type
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of data are also limited in the investigation of the determinants of herding. There is
no resolution on intra-quarter covariances of trades and returns and thus, these studies
fail to conclude whether institutions are reacting to or causing stock price movements,
see Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
A part of the empirical literature, e.g., Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009), attempts to
overcome the problem of data frequency by using anonymous transaction data instead
of reported holdings. However, those data do not identify the trader. Therefore, work
on this front separates trades by size and then identifies trades above a specific cutoff
size as institutional. However, even though large trades are almost exclusively the
province of institutions, institutions with superior information will split their trades
to hide their informational advantage. Moreover, these studies are unable to identify
the type of institution and thus cannot create sub-samples of traders. As a result, the
sources of herding remain unclear.
The current paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, by using
a new dataset, that includes high-frequency investor-level data that directly identify
institutional transactions, this paper overcomes the above-mentioned data limitations.
The analysis provides new evidence on the herding behavior of financial institutions
for a broad cross-section of stocks over the period from July 2006 to March 2009 in
the German stock market.1 By replicating the analysis with low-frequency data as
well as with cutoff levels, we find that previous studies might overestimate the extend
of herding. As a second contribution, and an improvement on previous descriptive
approaches, daily data combined with a panel analysis allow investigation into possible
sources of herding.
The estimation results reveal that financial institutions do indeed evidence herding
behavior and that this herding depends on stock characteristics as well as on past
returns and stock volatility. In particular, we find –contrary to previous evidence–
1The paper offers the first empirical investigation of herding by banks and other financial institutions
in the German stock market. Walter and Weber (2006) has analyzed herding for German mutual funds
at a semi-annual frequency.
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that herding is more pronounced in larger and more liquid stocks. The mean herding
measure for the 30 most professional institutions in DAX 30 stocks constitutes 5.17%
according to the Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure. Moreover, herding on the
sell side is positively related to past returns and past volatility whereas herding on
the buy side is negatively related to these variables. These results can be explained
by unintentional herding that results from shared investment styles and common risk
models. These conclusions hold irrespective of the herding measure applied. Results
obtained with the dynamic measure of Sias (2004) show that institutional trades are
correlated over time. However, although there are investors who follow other traders,
the main part of the correlation results from institutions that follow their own trading
strategy (i.e., unintentional herding).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theory behind
herding behavior. Section 3 summarizes the extend literature. Section 4 introduces
the data. Section 5 discusses the herding measures. Section 6 presents the empirical
analysis. Section 7 offers a summary of the main results and some concluding remarks.
2 Herding Theory
2.1 Types of Herding
2.1.1 Intentional vs. Unintentional Herding
The term ”herding” describes the tendency of institutions or individuals to show sim-
ilarity in their behavior and thus act like a ”herd.” There are several types of herd
behavior, defined by various explanations for the co-movement. Generally, herding
is divided into intentional herding and unintentional, or spurious herding (see, e.g.,
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001)).
Unintentional herding is mainly fundamental driven and arises because institutions
may examine the same factors and receive correlated private information, leading them
to arrive at similar conclusions regarding individual stocks (see, e.g., Hirshleifer, Sub-
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rahmanyam and Titman (1994)). Moreover, professionals may constitute a relatively
homogenous group: they share a similar educational background and professional qual-
ifications and tend to interpret informational signals similarly.
From a macroeconomic perspective, unintentional herding can be an efficient outcome if
it is driven by fundamentals. In contrast, intentional herding is generally considered to
be inefficient. Intentional herding is morse sentiment-driven and involves the imitation
of other market participants, resulting in simultaneous buying or selling of the same
stocks regardless of prior beliefs or information sets. This type of herding can lead to
asset prices failing to reflect fundamental information, exacerbation of volatility, and
destabilization of markets, thus having the potential to create, or at least contribute,
to bubbles and crashes on financial markets (see, e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990),
Shiller (1990), Morris and Shin (1999) or Persaud (2000)).
From a psychological point of view, the impetus underlying imitation has often been
assumed to stem from human nature itself, in the sense that people may tend toward
conformity (Hirshleifer (2001)) as a result of their interactive communication. Yet, in-
tentional herding might be rational from the trader’s perspective and can be attributed
to several factors leading to two major theoretical models.
2.1.2 Models of Intentional Herding
Information Cascade Model
According to the information cascade model (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch
(1992), Banerjee (1992) and Avery and Zemsky (1998)) traders copy the investment
activity of other market participants because they infer (from observed trading behav-
ior) that others have relevant information, resulting in an informational cascade. This
can occur when either the trader has no information himself when he beliefs his own
information is uncertain and that others are better informed. The trader might ignore
his information, even if this information is superior, because it is not strong enough to
change the crowd behavior. However, under this model, herding mainly occurs in the
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short-term, since the arrival of public information and consequent price adjustments
will stop ”incorrect” information cascades. This is especially the case in developed
capital markets. Advanced regulatory frameworks generally ensure the efficient flow of
information to the market. Due to higher turnover in developed markets, information
is usually timely incorporated into asset prices, thus rendering them more informative.
Reputation Based Model
Another explanation for herding behavior is posited by the reputation based model orig-
inally developed by Scharfstein and Stein (1990). According to this model, institutions
or professional investors are subject to reputational risk when they act differently from
the crowd. Thus, they may ignore information they possess and imitate the decisions
of the majority. Professionals are subject to periodic evaluation that often pits them
against each other. Thus, at least traders with poorer reputations have an incentive
to imitate those with better reputations. Overall, traders might perceive the conse-
quences of a potential failure as outweighing the benefits of a potential success from
going it alone (Graham (1999)). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) call this effect ”sharing
the blame.”
Models of intentional herding typically assume that there is only little reliable infor-
mation in the market and that traders are uncertain about their decisions and thus
follow the crowd. In contrast, in the case of unintentional herding, traders acknowledge
public information as reliable, interpret it similarly and thus they all end up on the
same side of the market. Therefore, all types of herding are linked to the uncertainty
or availability of information.
2.2 Revealing the Type of Herding
Distinguishing between different sources of herding behavior is crucial for regulatory
purposes and in determining whether herding leads to market inefficiency. However,
empirical discrimination between the different types is difficult due to the large number
5
of factors that may influence an investment decision and because the motives behind a
trade are not discernable.
2.2.1 Size Effects
The empirical literature explores the determinants of herding via the link between herd-
ing and information by considering variables that proxy, e.g., information availability.
Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Wermers (1999) segregate stocks by size because market
capitalization of firms usually reflects the quantity and quality of information available.
Thus, one would expect higher levels of herding in trading small stocks as evidence of
intentional herding.
2.2.2 Correlation of Trades Over Time
According to Sias (2004), the correlation of trades over time can be used to investigate
intentional herding. If this correlation does indeed result from copying other institutions
rather than following own trading strategies, it would be an indication of intentional
herding that arises due to imitation of others.
2.2.3 Feedback Trading
As unintentional herding arises due to simultaneous reactions to common signals, a
manifestation of this kind of herding is momentum investment, i.e., positive feedback
trading. If herding is driven by past returns, i.e., all traders react to price signals, fol-
lowing Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) and Sias (2004), this would be interpreted
as evidence of unintentional herding. Even though herding resulting from correlated
positive feedback trading is considered to be informed herding according to the the-
ory above, such herding might also have a destabilizing impact on financial markets.
Short-term strategies based on past returns imply pro-cyclical behavior that aggravates
downward or upward pressures in the market (see, e.g., De Long, Shleifer, Summers
and Waldmann (1990)).
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2.2.4 Risk Management Systems
Persaud (2002) argues that market-sensitive risk management systems used by banks,
such as Value at Risk (VaR) models, require banks to sell when prices decline and/or
volatility rises. Thus, banks act like a herd, all selling the same stocks at the same time
in response to negative shocks. Although this kind of trading is considered to be unin-
tentional herding, it leads to further slumps in prices. As institutions are increasingly
using the same VaR models, a situation brought about by regulators requiring high
and common standards, the tendency is convergence of market participants behavior.
In short, the market-sensitive risk management systems reduce the diversity of decision
rules.
3 Related Empirical Literature
3.1 First Evidence
One of the earliest works related to herding is that of Kraus and Stoll (1972), who
analyze parallel trading on a monthly basis among institutional investors such as mutual
funds and banks and conclude that institutions do not tend to trade in parallel with
each other. Lakonishok et al. (1992) adapt the central idea and construct a herding
measure that is now a standard in the empirical literature. Lakonishok et al. (1992)
test for herd behavior within a quarterly time span using a sample of U.S. equity funds
covering the period 1985 to 1989. They find only low values of herding for their overall
sample.
An alternative measure used in the literature is that constructed by Sias (2004). This
measure quantifies the degree to which institutions follow institutional trades of the
prior period. Using quarterly institutional data from 1983 to 1997, Sias (2004) finds
strong evidence of herding. A related recent study by Choi and Sias (2009) investigates
institutional herding in industries using the Sias herding measure. The authors also
report strong evidence of herding. Both herding measures will be employed in this
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paper and will be explained in Section 5.
3.2 Size and Performance of Stocks
Lakonishok et al. (1992) also constructed subsamples based on past performance and
the size of the stocks. Although different past performances of stocks did not lead to
significantly greater herding, they find evidence of herding being more intense among
small companies compared to large stocks, which is consistent with the theory of in-
tentional herding. Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) find a relation between past
performance and herding. They documented that positive feedback strategies are em-
ployed by the majority of the 274 U.S. mutual funds analyzed that demonstrated herd-
ing behavior in the 1975-1984 period. Further empirical evidence on the link between
herding, size and performance is provided by Wermers (1999), who finds a greater de-
gree of herding than Lakonishok et al. (1992) for a comprehensive sample of U.S. mutual
funds during 1975-1994. He also finds higher herding measures for small stocks and
for funds following positive feedback strategies. Wylie (2005) also applies the measure
proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992), but in a U.K. context. For U.K. mutual funds
over the period from 1986 to 1993, he finds that funds herd out of stocks that have
performed well in the past. Sias (2004) finds that herding is related to positive feed-
back trading; however, his results suggest that herding is mainly due to informational
cascades, i.e., intentional herding, which is also underlined by higher herding in smaller
stocks. In line with this literature, we will also consider the impact of past performance
and size effects on herding.
3.3 Development of the Market
Based on semi-annual data, Walter and Weber (2006) and Oehler and Wendt (2009)
report significant positive and higher levels of herding for German mutual funds com-
pared to those found in U.S.-based research. Walter and Weber (2006) link the finding
of herding to the stage of development of the financial market. They argue that the
German market is not as highly developed as the U.S. and U.K. capital markets. There
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is also evidence for higher herding levels in emerging markets compared to developed
ones. For example, Lobao and Serra (2007) document strong evidence of herding be-
havior for Portuguese mutual funds.2
High herding in emerging markets may be attributed to incomplete regulatory frame-
works, especially in the area ofmarket transparency. Deficiencies in corporate disclosure
and information quality create uncertainty in the market, throw doubt on the reliability
of public information, and thus impede fundamental analysis, see Antoniou, Ergul,
Holmes and Priestley (1997) and Gelos and Wei (2002). Kallinterakis and Kratunova
(2007) argue that in such an environment it is reasonable to assume that investors will
prefer to base their trading on their peers’ observed actions. Thus, intentional herding
through information cascades is more likely to occur in less developed markets. In the
current paper, we will account for the impact of market transparency by investigating
herding in different market segments.
3.4 State of the Market
There is also evidence that herding behavior may depend on the state of the overall
market. Choe et al. (1999) find, for the Korean stock market, higher herding levels
before the Asian crisis of 1997 than during the crises. Similarly, using data from U.S.
and South Korean stock markets, Hwang and Salmon (2004) find more evidence of
herding during relatively quiet periods than during periods when the market is under
stress. In contrast, the results of Bowe and Domuta (2004), based on data from the
Jakarta Stock Exchange, indicate that herding by foreigners increased following the
outbreak of the crisis. Therefore, in this paper, we separate our sample into crisis and
non-crisis periods to account for different herding intensities.
2Significant herding is reported for Indonesia (Bowe and Domuta (2004)), Poland (Voronkova and
Bohl (2005)), Korea (Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), Kim and Wei (2002)) and South Africa (Gilmour
and Smit (2002)).
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4 Data and Sample
4.1 Data Problems of Previous Literature
The literature on herding reviewed above is severely handicapped by the availability
of appropriate data. The studies rely either on holding positions of institutions or on
anonymous transaction data.
4.1.1 Low Frequency
Most studies on this topic identify institutional transactions as changes in reported
positions in a stock. However, positions are reported very infrequently, if at all. For
example, most of these studies focus on mutual funds as institutions, but in the U.S.,
mutual funds generally report on only a quarterly basis. For German mutual funds, half-
year reports are required.3 Semi-annual and even quarterly data provide only a crude
basis for inferring trades and this frequency is especially too low in a rapidly changing
stock market environment. As a result, herding might be understated, since trades
that are completed within the period are not captured. Moreover, theory predicts that
intentional herding arises due to informational cascades. However, in markets with fre-
quent public information flows and high turnover that lead to the timely incorporation
of information, informational cascades are likely to occur only in the short-term, that
is, before public information becomes available. Alternatively, herding might be over-
stated when looking at a long time interval, since buys at the beginning of the period
that are not completed within the period and buys of others at the end are regarded
as herding. For long time intervals, the concepts of parallel and imitative behavior
are severely stretched, to a level that causes concern. The studies are further limited
in investigating the determinants of herding. It may be difficult to correlate herding
measures with stock-specific characteristics that change throughout the quarter. In
particular, there is no resolution, fine-grained or otherwise, of intra-quarter covariances
3There are also studies that rely on yearly ownership data, see, e.g., Kim and Nofsinger (2005) who
investigate herding of financial institutions in Japan. One recent study by Puckett and Yan (2008) uses
weekly data and thus partially overcomes the low frequency problem.
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of trades and returns; thus these studies are unable to discover whether institutions are
reacting to stock price movements or causing price movements, see Lakonishok et al.
(1992).
4.1.2 Identification of Traders
The second set of studies in this field attempts to overcome the lack of data problem
by using transaction data and making assumptions about the trader. This work uses
a naive cutoff approach to identify institutional trades. Transactions above a specific
cutoff size are considered as a proxy for institutional trades, since large trades might
be the province of institutions. For example, Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) suggest a
cutoff of $50,000 for larger stocks. However, institutions can split their trades to hide
a possible superior information advantage. Thus, the most informative institutional
trades are not likely to be the largest. In fact, our dataset suggests that although
institutions trade often during a day, such trades are not necessarily large.4
4.2 The Unique BaFin Datasource
The dataset employed in this paper avoids most of the problems that plague earlier
work by including disaggregated high-frequency investor-level data. In fact, our dataset
includes all real-time transactions carried out on German stock exchanges. The data
are provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Under
Section 9 of the German Securities Trading Act, all credit institutions and financial
services institutions are required to report to BaFin any transaction in securities or
derivatives which are admitted to trading on an organized market.
These records enable the identification of all relevant trade characteristics, including
the trader (the institution), the particular stock, time, number of traded shares, price,
and the volume of the transaction. Moreover, the records identify on whose behalf
the trade was executed, i.e., whether the institution traded for its own account or
4Moreover, since trades below $5,000 are regarded as retail trades according to Lee and Radhakrishna
(2000), a large number of trades (i.e., those between 50, 000and5,000) remain unclassified.
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on behalf of a client that is not a financial institution. Since the aim of our study
is the investigation of institutional trades, particularly those of financial institutions,
we focus on the trading of own accounts, i.e., those cases when a bank or a financial
services institution is clearly the originator of the trade. Direct identification of the
trading financial institution also enables us to create subgroups of institutions in order
to examine differences in their behavior. We exclude institutions trading exclusively for
the purpose of market making. Of course, institutions engaging in proprietary business
may additionally act as market makers in some cases and the records do not distinguish
between those trades. However, it is expected that the proportion is small in highly
liquid markets.
Using data from July 2006 until March 2009 (a total of 698 trading days), we cover
market upturns as well as the recent market downturn. We will investigate whether
trading behavior has changed due to market turmoil.
The analysis focuses on shares listed on the three major German stock indices: the
DAX 30 (the index of the 30 largest and most liquid stocks), the MDAX (a mid-cap
index of 50 stocks that rank behind the DAX 30 in terms of size and liquidity), and
the SDAX (a small-cap index of 50 stocks that rank behind the MDAX components).5
These indices allow distinguishing between the trading behavior in small and large
stocks.
Over the observation period, we have 167,422,502 records of proprietary transactions
by 1,120 institutions in those stocks on German stock exchanges. For each institution,
we compute the daily trade imbalance. Among these 1,120 traders, 1,044 institutions
trade on the DAX 30 stocks, 742 on the MDAX stocks and 512 on the SDAX stocks.
On average, about 25 of these institutions trade every day in those stocks, justifying
the use of daily data. The institutions have an average daily market share of DAX
30 stocks of about 46%. Interestingly, the market share declined after the start of the
5 The stocks were selected according to the index compositions at the end of the observation period
on March 31, 2009. The time series of five stocks on the MDAX and five stocks on the SDAX are not
complete for the whole period. We have therefore an unbalanced panel of stocks and days, totaling
88,435 observations.
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Figure 1: Share of Institutional Investors in the Trading Volume of DAX 30
Notes: The figure shows the development of the share that institutions have in the trading
volume averaged over DAX 30 stocks. Source: BaFin records and Datastream.
recent financial crises, implying a retraction from trading business, see Figure 1. In
the period from July 1, 2006 until August 8, 2007, the proportion constituted 66%,
shrinking to 32% after August 9, 2007. Table 8 in the Appendix provides further
information on the investigated institutions.
5 Do Institutions Herd?
5.1 The Herding Measures
5.1.1 The LSV Measure
In a first step, our analysis uses the herding measure introduced by Lakonishok et al.
(1992) (LSV measure). According to the LSV measure, herding is defined as the ten-
dency of traders to accumulate on the same side of the market in a specific stock and
at the same time, relative to what would be expected if they traded independently.
The LSV measure assumes that under the null hypothesis of no herding, the decision to
buy or to sell is a bernoulli distributed random variable with equal success probability
for all stocks at a given time.6 Consider a number of Nit institutions trading in stock
6One implication of this assumption is that short selling must be possible. This assumption is not
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i at time t. Out of these Nit transactions, a number of bit are buy transactions. The
buyer ratio brit is then defined as brit = bitNit . The random variable bit is binomially
distributed.
The probability pit that an institution buys stock i at time t is determined by the
overall probability to buy at time t for all stocks b¯rt and, additionally, by the degree of
herding hit in the specific stock i at time t:
pit = b¯rt + hit. (1)
Consequently, under the null of no herding, pit = b¯rt, i.e., the probability to buy the
specific stock i at t corresponds to the overall probability to buy (b¯rt) at time t. The
number of buys of stock i at time t is then the result of nit independent draws from a
bernoulli distribution with probability b¯rt of success.
The buy probability b¯rt results from an overall signal in the market at time t. It is
measured as the expected value of the buyer ratio at t, Et[brit] = b¯rt, i.e., the period
average of the buyer ratio and thus the number of net buyers at time t aggregated






Under these assumptions, herding (hit) is defined as a deviation from the overall buy
probability at time t, i.e., as excess dispersion of what would be expected for that time.
Therefore, the measure captures similar trading patterns beyond market trends and
eliminates the influence of market-wide herding.
The LSV herding statistic is given by
HMit = |brit − b¯rt| − Et[|brit − b¯rt|]. (3)
problematic for our investigated institutions, for which short selling is in general feasible. In contrast,
most mutual funds investigated by previous studies are not allowed to engage in short sales. Thus, if
they have no holding in stock i, they can act only as buyer and the action would not be binomially
distributed.
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The first term captures the deviation of the buyers ratio in i at t from the overall
buy probability at time t. The latter term Et[|brit − b¯rt|] is the expected value of the
difference between the buyer ratio and period-average buyer ratio.
Under the assumption that the number of buys bit is binomially distributed with prob-
ability b¯rt and Nit independent draws, it is given by










∣∣∣∣ kNit − b¯rt
∣∣∣∣. (4)
Subtracting this term accounts for the possibility to observe more variation in the
buyers ratio in stocks with only a few trades, since buy decisions are stochastic. The
variance of brit depends on Nit and rises as the number of traders declines. Then, even
if no herding occurs the absolute value of |brit − b¯rt| is likely to be greater than zero.
Making this adjustment ensures that the herding measure HMit will be zero if the
trades are independent.7
The empirical literature following Lakonishok et al. (1992), calculates the mean across
all stocks and all periods, leading to the mean herding measure HM . A positive and
significant value of HM indicates the average tendency of the investigated group to
accumulate in their trading decisions. The higher the HM , the stronger the herding.
For example, HM = 2% indicates that out of every 100 transaction, two more traders
trade on the same side of the market than would be expected if each trader had decided
randomly and independently. However, it should be noted that the maximum value of
HM is not equal to one, even if all traders buy stock i at time t, since HMit is defined
as excess or additional herding over the overall trend b¯rt. Thus, only stock-picking
herding and similar trading patterns beyond market trends are analyzed.
7Following previous studies, e.g., Wermers (1999), HMit is computed only if at least five traders are
active in i at time t, leading to a loss of observations and an unbalanced panel. However, Table 8 in
the Appendix shows that even on the SDAX on average 10.78 institutions are active each day in each
stock. Out of the overall panel of stocks and days (88,435 observations), we calculated 87,839 herding
measures, i.e., for 542 observations there were no trade imbalances by any institution. Due to the
constraint to a minimum of five traders, we lose 3,997 observations for the sample of all institutional
traders, i.e., 83,842 observations remain. Tables 13 and 14 in the Appendix display results with different
minimum numbers of traders and reveal that results are robust with respect to the assumptions on
minimum numbers of traders.
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The herding measure HMit gauges herding without regard to the direction of the trades
(buy or sell). Following Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wermers (1999), we also distin-
guish between ”buy herding” BHMit and ”sell herding” SHMit, to discover whether
institutions buy or sell a stock i in herds. The sample is therefore separated into
BHMit = HMit if brit > b¯rt and SHMit = HMit if brit < b¯rt. Note that brit = b¯rt
is not captured by BHMit or by SHMit because in this case no herding occurs, i.e.,
there is no herding on either the buy or on the sell side.8
The discrimination between BHMit and SHMit captures asymmetries in institutions’
behavior when buying or selling. The separate measurement of herding into stocks and
out of stocks will be important when analyzing the determinants of trading behavior
in Section 6.2.
5.1.2 The Sias Measure
The LSV herding measure is a static measure that detects contemporaneous buying
or selling within the same time period. In contrast, Sias’s (2004) dynamic approach
explores whether the buying tendency of traders persists over time, directly testing
whether institutional investors follow each others’ trades by examining the correlation
between institutional trades in one period and the next period. We will use this measure
in Section 6.2 to arrive at deeper insight into the sources of herding and to better
distinguish between intentional and unintentional herding.
The starting point of this measure is again the number of buyers as a fraction of
all traders. For the sake of comparison, we refer to the same denomination as in
the previous section, i.e., the buyer ratio brit. According to Sias (2004), the ratio is





where σ(brit) is the standard deviation across stocks at time t.
8Comparing the observations in, e.g., Table 6, the resulting loss of data is not empirically relevant.
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The Sias herding measure is defined as the correlation between the standardized buyer
ratios in consecutive periods:
∆it = βt∆i,t−1 + ²it. (6)
The cross-sectional regression is estimated for each day t and then the time-series aver-
age of the coefficients is calculated: β =
∑T
t+1 βt
T−1 . A positive and significant coefficient
β can be interpreted as first evidence of herding.9
Thus, a high buyer ratio would usually result in a higher LSV measure (if higher than
on average) but not necessarily to a higher Sias measure as this depends on the ratio
at the next trading day. Alternatively, a buyer ratio of 51% would lead to moderate
herding as determined by the LSV measure, but could show strong evidence of herding
according to Sias, if this low ratio persists in the next period.
The Sias methodology further differentiates between investors who follow the trades
of others (i.e., true intentional herding according to Sias (2004)) and those who follow
their own trades, still resulting in herding, but of the unintentional variety. For this
purpose, the correlation is decomposed into two components:






















(Dnit − b¯rt)(Dmi,t−1 − b¯rt−1)
NitNi,t−1
 , (7)
where Nit is again the number of institutions trading stock i during day t. I is the
number of stocks traded by the institutions at time t. Dnit is a dummy variable that
equals one if institution n is a buyer in i at time t; zero otherwise. Also, Dmi,t−1 is a
dummy variable that equals one if trader m (who is different from trader n) is a buyer
at day t− 1.
9As in the case of the LSV measure and in line with Sias (2004) only observations with at least five
traders active in i at time t are considered in the estimation.
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The first part of the measure represents the component of the cross-sectional inter-
temporal correlation that results from institutions following their own strategies when
buying or selling the same stocks over adjacent days. The second part indicates the
portion of correlation resulting from institutions following the trades of others over
adjacent days.
According to Choi and Sias (2009), Equation (7) can be further decomposed to dis-
tinguish between the correlations associated with ”buy herding” and ”sell herding”.
Hence, stocks are classified by whether institutions bought in t − 1 (bri,t−1 > 0.5) or
sold in t− 1 (bri,t−1 < 0.5).
According to Sias (2004), a positive correlation that results from institutions following
other institutions, i.e., the latter part of the decomposed correlation, can be regarded
as evidence for informational cascades, i.e., intentional herding.10
5.2 Results on LSV Herding
5.2.1 Daily Herding Measure for All Institutions
Our results regarding overall LSV herding are presented in Table 1. The mean value
of the herding measure HM at daily frequency over the complete period and over all
stocks in our datasample is 1.40%. The value is statistically significant but small and
slightly lower than found in previous studies using low-frequency data, e.g., Lakonishok
et al. (1992) and Walter and Weber (2006), both of which found herding to be about
2.70%.
Table 1 shows a significantly higher herding measure in DAX 30 stocks: the mean
herding measure for stocks in this major German index is 3.63%, i.e., about 2.5 times
larger than for the whole sample. Therefore, in contrast to previous findings (e.g.,
Wermers (1999) or Lakonishok et al. (1992)), reporting that correlated trading is higher
in small stocks, our sample institutions particularly herd in to and out of large stocks.
10This part of the correlation will be insignificant if institutional trades are independent of other
institutional trades on the previous day. A negative correlation would indicate that institutions act in
the opposite direction than did the others on the day before.
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Table 1: Mean Daily LSV Herding Measures (1)
All Stocks DAX 30







































Observations 50,585 25,361 25,219 12,474 5,884 6,589
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms
for the whole sample of stocks and for DAX 30 stocks considering all institutions in the
sample. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The measures are calculated considering
a minimum number of 5 traders for each stock on each trading day. The herding measures
are first computed over the whole sample stocks and over all trading days and than averaged
across the different time spans and the sub-sample of stocks.
Table 9 in the Appendix shows that daily herding measures for MDAX stocks are
significantly lower (1.24%) and daily herding in SDAX is actually insignificant. This
result is also in contradiction of the theory of intentional herding, which predicts higher
herding levels in stocks with less information availability and asymmetry. The herding
behavior is thus more likely of the unintentional type.
We also consider different periods for computing the average herding measure to in-
vestigate whether herding varies between the crisis and non-crisis period, i.e., before
and after August 9, 2007. Results displayed in Table 1 reveal slightly more evidence
of herding in DAX 30 stocks before the financial crises but herding over all stocks and
MDAX and SDAX stocks is higher during the crises. The difference between buy and
sell herding suggests that institutions more likely herd out of stocks during the crises
period. This might be a result of higher volatility of stocks during the financial crisis
but could also be related to lower or negative returns on the stocks, suggesting positive
19
feedback trading. Empirical analysis discussed in Section 6.2 sheds light on this issue.
5.2.2 The Role of Low-Frequency and Cutoff Size
The bulk of the literature on herding by necessity relies either on lower frequency data or
uses transaction data and makes assumptions regarding the identity of the trader using
a cutoff approach for identifying institutional trades. For the sake of comparison and
to shed more light on the impact these data limitations have on the herding measure,
we re-calculate the measures constraining our sample to quarterly data and to trades
above a specific size.
Simulation with Low-Frequency
Table 2: Mean Quarterly LSV Herding Measures (1)
All Stocks DAX 30







































Observations 872 428 444 208 109 99
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the whole sample of stocks and for DAX 30 stocks considering all institutions in the sample.
The measures are calculated considering a minimum number of 5 traders for each stock
during a quarter. The herding measures are first computed over the whole sample stocks
and over all quarters and than averaged across the different time spans and the sub-sample
of stocks.
For this analysis, instead of using the daily trade imbalance of a specific institution,
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we calculate monthly and quarterly trade imbalances. Results displayed in Table 2
reveal that herding measures are higher on a quarterly horizon and in a range similar
to that found in previous studies using quarterly data. Comparing daily, monthly, and
quarterly results (see also Tables 15 - 17 in the Appendix), the herding measure rises
when lower frequency data are employed, indicating a slight overestimation of herding
measures, particularly for small-capitalized stocks, when using low-frequency data.
Simulation with Cutoff Size
Table 3: Mean Daily LSV Herding Measures - Cutoff Size (1)
All Stocks DAX 30







































Observations 47,261 22,988 24,272 12,439 6,188 6,250
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms
for the whole sample of stocks and for DAX 30 stocks considering all institutions in the
sample but dropping transactions below e34,000 for DAX stocks, e14,000 for MDAX
stocks and e7,000 for SDAX stocks. See Table 1 for further information.
Following studies that use cutoff approaches to identify institutional transactions (e.g.,
Barber et al. (2009)), we drop from our sample institutional trades below a specific
size. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) suggests cutoffs of $50,000, $20,000, and $10,000
for large, medium, and small stocks. Assuming the current level of exchange rates,
we adopt that idea and consider only trades in DAX, MDAX, and SDAX stocks that
have a volume of more than e34,000, e14,000, and e7,000, respectively. Out of our
21
overall 167,422,502 records we lose 118,307,150 due to this constraint. We ignore trader
identification, thus treating every remaining transaction independently, i.e., if the same
institution trades more than once during a day, its transactions are regarded as trades
by different institutions.
The results for the mean daily herding measures are displayed in Table 3 and for MDAX
and SDAX stocks in Table 18 in the Appendix. The calculated means now reveal much
higher herding levels, suggesting an overestimation of herding when using a cutoff
approach. Moreover, herding is much more pronounced during the crises period. The
difference between buy and sell herding is quite small, suggesting a high correlation of
large buy trades as well as large sell trades during the crises. Overall, the results of the
re-calculations indicate that earlier literature might have overestimated the extend of
herding.
5.2.3 Subgroups of Institutions
The theory of unintentional herding predicts higher herding levels among institutions
that share the same investment style and same professional qualifications (see Hir-
shleifer et al. (1994)). Moreover, according to the reputation based model, higher
intentional herding can be expected in a more homogenous group of professionals who
are evaluated against each other (see Scharfstein and Stein (1990)). The overall sample
investigated in Section 5.2.1 is comprised of a large heterogeneous group of institutions,
but the herding behavior of subgroups of institutions is of interest as well, and we now
shift our focus to these groups.
Among the 1,120 institutions, the 30 most active traders, according to their trading
volume in the investigated shares, account for 80% of the entire trading volume over
all institutions and can thus be regarded as the most professional and most important
for the stock market. These professionals can be considered as belonging to the same
peer group.
Creating a subsample based on the trading activity reveals a higher herding measure
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for the 30 most active traders, see Table 4.11 The mean daily herding measure across
all stocks is 2.5%. There is evidence for more herding on the buy side in the non-crisis
period and higher herding on the sell side during the crisis. This might be a result of
higher volatility of stocks during the financial crisis but could also be related to lower
or negative returns of the stocks, suggesting positive feedback trading. Our empirical
analysis in Section 6.2 shall provides more insight into this issue.
Table 4: Daily LSV Herding Measures of 30 Most Active Traders (1)
All Stocks DAX 30







































Observations 38,601 18,938 19,636 12,426 6,146 6,273
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the whole sample of stocks and for DAX 30 stocks considering only the 30 most active
institutions in the sample. These 30 institutions are identified according to their overall
trading volume over the whole sample period and all sample stocks. See Table 1 for further
information.
Considering DAX 30 stocks, the herding measure rises to 5.17%, a high level of herding
compared to previous findings. For MDAX and SDAX stocks, the herding measure is
also higher, but still small, see Table 10 in the Appendix.
The subgroup of the 30 most active traders includes a few financial institutions other
than banks (i.e. financial service institutions) and also several foreign investment banks.
11Note that considering a subgroup of 30 institutions instead of, e.g., 10 ensures that enough traders
are active in a specific stock on a specific day. Nevertheless, 14,879 observations are lost, i.e., 68,963
observations remain.
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We create another subsample comprising only the 40 most active German banks that
are engaged in proprietary trading on stock markets.12 These banks are all subject
to the same regulatory regime and oversight by the financial authority. Although the
regulatory framework and risk management systems for the foreign banks are expected
to be similar, for these German banks we were able to ensure –by means of an inves-
tigation of the risk reports included in their annual reports– that they commonly use
VaR models and implement regulatory or internal VaR limits.
The results shown in Table 11 in the Appendix are similar to those for the subgroup
of 30. Again, the herding measure is much higher in DAX 30 stocks, with a mean of
5.21%. In line with the results above, buy herding is higher in the pre-crises period,
whereas sell herding is more pronounced during the crisis. Results for MDAX and
SDAX stocks are again significantly lower and even insignificant in case of buy herding
in SDAX stocks, see Table 12 in the Appendix.
6 Revealing the Determinants of Herding
6.1 Possible Determinants of Herding
According to the theory discussed in Section 2.1 herding behavior centers around infor-
mation in the market. On the one hand, intentional herding results from information
asymmetry or information uncertainty. On the other hand, unintentional herding is
related to reliable public information. In our investigation of the sources of herding,
we thus focus especially on empirical proxies to measure information availability, infor-
mation asymmetry or uncertainty in the market and on those determinants that may
imply a destabilizing pro-cyclicality.
12We select those institutions according to their trading volume over the observation period in the
selected stocks. We select only German institutions based on the definition of same in Section 1
Paragraph 1 of the German Banking Act. Note that we now use 40 instead of 30 to ensure that
enough traders are active in a specific stock on a specific day. The sample is now comprised of 69,257
observations.
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First, following previous literature on herding, we consider firm size (Size) as one
possible determinant of herding. Small firms are usually less transparent, i.e., less public
information is available. The model of intentional herding would therefore predict an
inverse relation between herding and firm size. Also, the evidence reviewed in Section
3 finds a higher herding level in smaller stocks. In contrast, our results in Section 5.2
indicate higher herding in larger stocks. Firm size is measured by the logarithm of the
previous day’s closing market capitalization of the specific stock.
A second factor possibly related to herding could be the trading volume (V ol) of a
specific stock. A vast literature highlights the relation between information quality,
market liquidity and information asymmetries. In particular, Diamond and Verrecchia
(1991) predict higher information asymmetry in less liquid markets. Suominen’s (2001)
model suggests that higher trading volume indicates better information quality. Leuz
and Verrecchia (2000) and Welker (2006) argue that market liquidity can be measured
by transaction volumes or bid-ask spreads. We therefore use market volumes of stocks
as a proxy for information asymmetry and expect, based on intentional herding theory,
that lower trading volumes are associated with higher herding levels.
Third, we compute stock return volatility (Std) based on the standard deviation of the
past 250 daily stock returns.13 On the one hand, stock return volatility is assumed to
reflect the extent of disagreement among market participants, thus proxying the degree
of uncertainty in the market. Intentional herding models would therefore predict a
higher herding in stocks that experienced higher degree of volatility. Note that higher
information uncertainty is equally likely to induce herding on both the buy and sell
side. On the other hand, higher levels of herding in more volatile stocks might also be
related to a common use of VaR models or other volatility sensitive models employed
for risk management purposes and regulatory requirements, see Persaud (2002). The
minimum observation period according to Basel II market risk standards is one year, i.e.,
250 trading days. Therefore, in our subsample of the 30 most active traders, we expect
to see more sell herding in stocks with higher past year standard deviation of stock
13We also use the last 90 and 30 stock returns to check robustness.
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returns, since those regulated institutions highly engaged in trading generally use such
risk management models. Moreover, our subgroup of 40 German banks is comprised
exclusively of banks using VaR models and implementing regulatory or internal VaR
limits.14 A positive impact of volatility on sell herding but not on buy herding could
then be considered as evidence of unintentional herding.
Fourth, we consider past returns of stocks (r). As unintentional herding occurs due to
the simultaneous reaction to common signals, a manifestation of this kind of herding is
momentum investment. De Long et al. (1990) argue that institutions follow short-term
strategies based on positive feedback trading and thus show pro-cyclical behavior. Such
a trading pattern could result in herding, i.e., if all react to the same price signals, see
Froot et al. (1992).
Table 5 summarizes the theoretical predictions on the determinants of herding. Note
that the role of stock return volatility, Std, may differ for buy and sell herding.
Table 5: Theoretical Predictions on the Determinants of Herding
Intentional Unintentional
Size – +
V ol – +
r 0 +/–
Std∗ + –
Notes: This table classifies the predicted impact of firm size
(Size), trading volume (V ol), stock returns (r) and volatility
(Std) on the herding measure. ∗In case of Std the classifica-
tion may differ for buy and sell herding. ”-”, ”+” and ”0”
denotes a negative, positive and insignificant impact, respec-
tively.
14According to statements in their risk reports included in annual reports.
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6.2 Empirical Results of a Fixed Effects Panel Model
6.2.1 Empirical Determinants of Herding Behavior
To examine the relation between institutional herding and its possible determinants,
we estimate the following fixed effects panel regression model:
HMit = a+ bSizei,t−1 + cV olit + d|ri,t−1|+ eStdit + αi + γt + ²it, (8)
where HMit is the LSV herding measure as calculated according to Equation (3).
Sizei,t−1 is measured by the logarithm of the previous day’s closing market capitaliza-
tion of stock i. V olit captures the logarithm of the trading volume of stock i during
trading day t. |ri,t−1| is the absolute value of the return of stock i measured from the
closing prices on day t− 1 and t− 2. The absolute value is used since HMit does not
discriminate between the buy and sell sides. Stdit is the volatility, measured as the stan-
dard deviation of the past 250 daily stock returns. αi are heterogenous stock-specific
effects and γt are time dummies.15
We concentrate on the herding measures for the two homogeneous subgroups of the 30
most active traders and the 40 most active German banks. We are especially interested
in whether their higher herding measures result from unintentional herding due to a
shared investment style or from intentional herding due their membership in the same
peer group, see Section 2.1. Moreover, these institutions are the most relevant for the
stock market. The discovery of intentional herding or pro-cyclical behavior by these
groups would suggest a high potential threat to for financial stability.
Table 6 shows the results of a fixed effects panel regression with the 30 most active
traders. Results for the 40 largest German banks are again similar and are displayed
in Table 19 in the Appendix. Let us first look at the results for the regression with
the unsigned herding measure HM , which are displayed in the first column. The
15An F-test strongly suggests the inclusion of time dummies γt in the regressions and a Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test on H0 : σ
2
i = 0 indicates the existence of individual effects αi.
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Observations 65,846 34,130 31,691
Notes: The herding measure HMit for the subgroup of 30 most active traders is regressed on
variables Sizei,t−1, V olit, |ri,t−1| and Stdit. The buy and sell herding measures BHMit and
SHMit is regressed on variables Sizei,t−1, V olit, ri,t−1 and Stdit. The variable Sizei,t−1 is
the logarithm of market capitalization, V olit is the logarithm of the trading volume of stock,
ri,t−1 is the daily stock return and |ri,t−1| is its absolute value. Stdit measures the standard
deviation of past 250 daily stock returns. Dummybit (Dummy
s
it) is a dummy variable, that equals
one, if buy herding (sell herding) occurred also on the previous day t − 1, and zero otherwise.
The statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is represented as ***, **, and * respectively.
Standard errors are given in parentheses in the upper part of the table. The lower part of the
table reports test statistics and p-values in parentheses. Wooldridge and Cook−Weisberg are
tests on serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of error terms. Sargan−Hansen displays the
overidentification test on the independence of random effects.
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coefficient estimate for Size is insignificant and the coefficient V ol is positive and
statistically significant. First, this suggests that the evidence of higher herding levels
for DAX 30 stocks in Section 5.2 is more likely the result of these stocks’ higher liquidity
than due to higher market capitalization. However, the size effect might already be
captured by the fixed effects in the regression, since market capitalization changes only
slightly over time.16 Second, since higher trading volume is related to lower information
asymmetry and higher information quality, see, e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1991),
this result suggests that these large financial institutions are less likely to engage in
intentional herding. The result could be an indication of unintentional herding, whereby
the institutions share a common investment style and prefer to buy and sell stocks with
higher trading volume.
The parameter estimate for volatility of returns Std, measured as the standard deviation
of stock returns over the last year, shows that Std has a positive impact on herding,
indicating that there is more herding for more volatile stocks. Volatility in the market
is related to uncertainty and thus, at first glance, this estimate appears inconsistent
since it hints at the existence of intentional herding. However, the estimate could also
be related to the common use of risk management models that recommend selling the
more volatile stocks. Results on buy and sell herding discussed below shed more light
on this issue.
6.2.2 Empirical Determinants of Buy and Sell Herding
The variables described above might affect buy and sell herding differently. We therefore
estimate Equation (8) separately for herding on the buy and sell side using the same set
of explanatory variables, except that the absolute return |r| is replaced by the signed
return r as the direction of the recent price movement will affect whether momentum
investors herd more on the buy or sell side:
16In a pooled OLS regression, market capitalization has a positive significant impact. Results are
available on request.
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In these regressions we also include a dummy variable Dummybit (Dummy
s
it), equal to
one, if buy herding (sell herding) also occurred on the previous day t−1; zero otherwise.
These dummies partly account for persistence of herding on either the buy or sell side.17
The results for the fixed effects regressions on buy and sell herding are reported in
the second and third columns of Table 6. Estimates for V ol reveal that herding on
the buy and sell sides is positively related to the liquidity of stocks. Again, market
capitalization, measured as Size, does not play an important role.
The positive and significant impact of the dummy variables shows that herding on
the buy side (sell side) is positively correlated with previous day’s buy herding (sell
herding). We shed more light on this correlation in the next section by using the Sias
measure.
The results for r and Std are interesting. First, the coefficient estimate for Std on buy
herding is significantly negative. In the case of sell-side herding Std, has a significant
positive impact. Hence, the higher the volatility of a stock, the more herding occurs
on the sell side. It is therefore unlikely that there is intentional herding behavior based
on uncertainty in the market, since this should affect buy and sell herding in the same
way. Apparently, institutions share the preference to sell (buy) stocks that have shown
a high (low) volatility. This is a clear indication for unintentional herding that might
be a result of risk management practices, see Persaud (2002).18
17We include dummy variables rather than the lagged endogenous variable to avoid too many missing
observations. For a deeper look at the dynamics of herding, we employ the Sias measure in the next
section. Note also that the exclusion of those dummies would not change the significance or the signs
of the other covariates. The magnitude of the coefficients for rit would increase slightly.
18The results are robust with respect to shorter periods for the calculation of the standard deviation.
Using the past 90 daily stock returns or the past 30 daily stock returns does not change the results
significantly. For brevity, these results are not presented, but are available on request.
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The estimated impact of returns r is statistically significant for buy and sell herding
regressions. As in the case of Std, the coefficient estimates are of opposite signs – i.e.,
buy herding is significantly negatively related to past returns, while past returns have
a positive impact on sell herding. This contradicts the conclusion drawn in previous
studies (e.g., Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999) or Walter and Weber (2006))
that institutions are momentum investors and follow positive feedback strategies. In
contrast, in our sample, institutions share a preference for buying past losers and selling
past winners. Overall, the results indicate that herding occurs mostly unintentionally
and is due to shared preferences and investment styles.19
The lower part of Table 6 presents the relevant test statistics and p-values of diagnos-
tic tests. The three models (Equations 8) - (10) were estimated as fixed effects panel
regressions using the within estimator, i.e., the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) of devi-
ations from stock-specific means, which is feasible according to the tests employed.20
We account for heteroscedasticity in the error terms, by using heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors, see Stock and Watson (2008).
6.2.3 The Dynamics of Herding
Table 6 shows that the buy and sell herding measures are positively related to buy
or sell herding on the previous day. To discover the reason behind this correlation
and how the correlation affects our interpretation of the sources of herding, we use the
methodology of Sias (2004), which explores whether the buying tendency of traders
persists over time (see Section 5.1.2). One motivation for adopting this approach is
to better distinguish between intentional and unintentional herding. To this end, the
19We also included lagged returns up to five trading days, ri,t−2,..,ri,t−5, in the regressions to check
whether further past returns influence herding. Our results do not change qualitatively. The coefficient
estimates of all past returns have the same sign, i.e., are all negative in the buy herding regression and
all positive in the sell herding regression. However, coefficient estimates of returns prior to t − 2 are
insignificant. Moreover, instead of measuring daily ri,t−1 with regard to the closing prices on day t− 1
and t− 2, we also use a weekly return measure, i.e., calculated from closing prices on t− 1 and t− 6.
Our results in all regressions do not change qualitatively. For brevity, these results are not presented,
but are available on request.
20This estimator is feasible, since according to a Hausman test on endogeneity of the regressors, the
null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected.
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Sias measure directly indicates whether institutional investors follow each others’ trades
by examining the correlation between institutional trades in one period and the next
period.
Table 7: Mean Sias Measure of 30 Most Active Traders
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation

























































Notes: This Table reports results of the Sias measure for all stocks in the samples but considering
only the 30 most active institutions. The upper part of the table reports values of the average
correlation in percentage terms of the coefficient β. The correlations where first estimated with a
cross-sectional regression for each day t and stocks i. The reported correlations display the time-
series average of the regression coefficients in percentage terms. The second and third column report
the partitioned correlations that result from institutions following their own trades and institutions
follow the trades of others, see Equation (7). In the lower parts of the table the correlation is
partitioned into those stocks institutions purchased at the previous day (buy herding) and those
institutions sold (sell herding). Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 7 displays the results obtained from the Sias herding measure for the 30 most
active institutional traders. The estimated correlation at daily frequency over the
complete period and over all stocks in the datasample is 16.42% (coefficient β = 0.1642),
which is slightly higher than the value obtained by Sias (2004), but lower than the result
of Puckett and Yan (2008) for weekly frequency.21
After decomposition of the coefficient into the two different sources of the correlation,
results reveal that the institutions follow their own strategies as well as those of others
(i.e., herd) in to and out of stocks. However, the greatest part of the correlation,
about 69.42% (=0.1045/0.1642), results from institutions that follow their own trading
strategies. A correlation of only 5.02% is found for institutions following the trades of
others. In contrast, Sias (2004), Choi and Sias (2009), and Puckett and Yan (2008)
find a higher proportion of following others at lower frequencies.22
Differentiating across the non-crisis and crisis period reveals higher correlation before
the crisis. Also, differentiating between buy and sell herding, shows consistent with the
LSV results, higher herding tendency on the sell side.
Overall, the results obtained from the Sias (2004) measure reveal a correlation of in-
stitutional buyer ratios. The results show that a main part of this correlation stems
from institutions that follow their own trades (i.e., unintentional herding), while the
evidence for institutions following others is less pronounced. This result suggests, that
institutions are actually following their own trading strategies rather than herding in-
tentionally as a result of informational cascades.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on herding by using high-frequency
investor-level data that directly identifies institutional transactions. The analysis there-
21Note that the inclusion of the control variables described earlier in the regression reduces the
magnitude of the correlation (β) to 15.1%. However, the correlation is still significant.
22Results obtained for the 50 most active German banks are again similar and are displayed in Table
20 in the Appendix.
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fore overcomes the data problems faced by previous studies and provides new evidence
on the short-term herding behavior of financial institutions.
Applying Lakonishok et al.’s (1992) herding measure to a broad cross-section of German
stocks over the period from August 2006 to April 2009, we find an overall level of herding
of 1.44% for all investigated financial institutions, which is quite low. By creating more
homogeneous subgroups of institutions, the level of herding rises substantially.
As opposed to findings in prior studies, our results do not confirm that small capital-
ization stocks are more vulnerable to herding behavior. We find that herding is more
pronounced in DAX 30 shares with a herding level of 3.63% for all institutions and
5.17% for the 30 most active institutions. These results suggest that herding behavior
is not the result of insufficient information availability or information asymmetry, but
is rather unintentional.
Our regression analysis confirms this conclusion and provides further insight into the
determinants of herding. Herding depends on past volatility and past returns of the
specific stock. Herding on the buy side is negatively related, whereas herding on the
sell side is positively related, to past returns. These results imply –contrary to previous
studies– that financial institutions are not engaged in positive feedback strategies.
We also find a correlation of buy herding or sell herding over time. Using the dynamic
methodology of Sias (2004), results show that trades of institutions are correlated over
time, but the main proportion stems from institutions following their own trading
strategies. This again implies that although there may be some intentional herding,
the main part of the correlated trades occur unintentionally.
Finally, we find that rising stock volatility leads to more sell-side herding by financial
institutions. This result is in line with the predictions of Persaud (2002) who argues
that the common use of VaR models reduces the diversity of decision rules, resulting in
herding behavior by banks. Therefore, regulators need to be aware of how risk manage-
ment systems, particularly those systems that used in common by a great many large
institutions, can affect the macro-prudential aspects of risks and incentive diversity of
34
behavior among market participants.
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A Appendix
Table 8: Statistics on Trading of Institutions
All DAX 30 MDAX SDAX
Average daily number of traders active
Whole sample 25.14 50.79 23.41 10.78
<08/09/07 31.96 65.26 28.80 13.10
≥08/09/07 20.80 41.01 20.00 9.34
Average daily market share in percent
Whole sample 51.00 45.97 51.00 54.30
<08/09/07 70.34 65.91 75.33 68.71
≥08/09/07 39.45 32.46 37.43 45.82
Notes: The first part of the table reports the average of investigated
institutions active in a specific stock on a specific day. The numbers are
computed according to the daily trade imbalance of the institutions.
The second part of the table reports the share that the investigated
institutions have in the trading volume of a specific stock on a specific
day averaged over all stocks and days in percentage terms.
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Table 9: Mean Daily LSV Herding Measures (2)
MDAX SDAX







































Observations 20,611 10,700 9,909 17,500 8,777 8,721
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the MDAX and SDAX stocks considering all institutions in the sample. See Table 1 for
further information.
Table 10: Daily LSV Herding Measures of 30 Most Active Traders (2)
MDAX SDAX







































Observations 18,919 9,302 9,599 7,256 3,490 3,764
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
MDAX and SDAX stocks considering only the 30 most active institutions in the sample.
These 30 institutions are identified according to their overall trading volume over the whole
sample period and all sample stocks. See Table 1 for further information.
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Table 11: Daily LSV Herding Measures of 40 Most Active German Banks (1)
All Stocks DAX 30







































Observations 41,639 20,845 20,787 12,472 6,088 6,383
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the whole sample of stocks and for DAX 30 stocks considering only the 40 largest German
banks that are engaged in proprietary trading. See Table 1 for further information.
Table 12: Daily LSV Herding Measures of 40 Most Active German Banks (2)
MDAX SDAX







































Observations 19,558 10,007 9,546 9,609 4,750 4,858
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
MDAX and SDAX stocks considering only the 40 largest German banks that are engaged
in proprietary trading. See Table 1 for further information.
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Table 13: Mean Daily LSV Herding Measures - Different Minimum Numbers of Trader
Active (1)
All Stocks DAX 30




















































Observations 42,385 21,270 21,108 20,201 9,729 10,468
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the whole sample of stocks and the sub-sample of DAX 30 stocks considering all institutions
in the sample but different minimum numbers of traders active (0, 5, 10 or 20) for each
stock on each trading day. The herding measures are first computed over the whole sample
stocks and over all trading days (but only for that cases were the respective minimum trader
amount is given) and than averaged across the different sub-sample of stocks. Standard
errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 14: Mean Daily LSV Herding Measures - Different Minimum Numbers of Trader
Active (2)
MDAX SDAX




















































Observations 19,116 9,833 9,280 3,068 1,708 1,360
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
MDAX and SDAX stocks considering all institutions in the sample but different minimum
numbers of traders active (0, 5, 10 or 20) for each stock on each trading day. The herding
measures are first computed over the whole sample stocks and over all trading days (but
only for that cases were the respective minimum trader amount is given) and than averaged
across the different sub-sample of stocks. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 15: Mean Monthly LSV Herding Measures (1)
All Stocks DAX 30







































Observations 2,461 1,242 1,219 580 309 271
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the whole sample of stocks and for DAX 30 stocks considering all institutions in the sample.
The measures are calculated considering a minimum number of 5 traders for each stock
during each month. The herding measures are first computed over the whole sample stocks
and over all months and than averaged across the different time spans and the sub-sample
of stocks. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 16: Mean Monthly LSV Herding Measures (2)
MDAX SDAX







































Observations 947 509 438 934 424 510
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the MDAX and SDAX stocks considering all institutions in the sample. See Table 15 for
further information.
Table 17: Mean Quarterly LSV Herding Measures (2)
MDAX SDAX







































Observations 334 182 152 330 137 193
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms for
the MDAX and SDAX stocks considering all institutions in the sample. See Table 2 for
further information.
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Table 18: Mean Daily LSV Herding Measures - Cutoff Size (2)
MDAX SDAX







































Observations 19,581 9,524 10,057 15,241 7,276 7,965
Notes: This table reports mean values of HM , BHM and SHM in percentage terms
for the MDAX and SDAX stocks considering all institutions in the sample but dropping
transactions below e14,000 for MDAX stocks and e7,000 for SDAX stocks. See Table 1
for further information.
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Observations 66,350 33,079 33,265
Notes: The herding measure HMit for the subgroup of 40 largest German banks is regressed
on variables Sizei,t−1, V olit, |ri,t−1| and Stdit. The buy and sell herding measures BHMit
and SHMit is regressed on variables Sizei,t−1, V olit, ri,t−1 and Stdit. The variable Sizei,t−1
is the logarithm of market capitalization, V olit is the logarithm of the trading volume of stock,
ri,t−1 is the daily stock return and |ri,t−1| is its absolute value. Stdit measures the standard
deviation of past 250 daily stock returns. Dummybit (Dummy
s
it) is a dummy variable, that equals
one, if buy herding (sell herding) occurred also on the previous day t − 1, and zero otherwise.
The statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is represented as ***, **, and * respectively.
Standard errors are given in parentheses in the upper part of the table. The lower part of the
table reports test statistics and p-values in parentheses. Wooldridge and Cook−Weisberg are
tests on serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of error terms. Sargan−Hansen displays the
overidentification test on the independence of random effects.
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Table 20: Mean Sias Measure of 40 Most Active German Banks
Average Correlation Partitioned Correlation

























































Notes: This Table reports results of the Sias measure for all stocks in the samples but considering
only the 30 most active institutions. The upper part of the table reports values of the average
correlation in percentage terms of the coefficient β. The correlations where first estimated with a
cross-sectional regression for each day t and stocks i. The reported correlations display the time-
series average of the regression coefficients in percentage terms. The second and third column report
the partitioned correlations that result from institutions following their own trades and institutions
follow the trades of others, see Equation (7). In the lower parts of the table the correlation is
partitioned into those stocks institutions purchased at the previous day (buy herding) and those
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